UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
NEREIDA B.,	
Plaintiff,	
V.	1:20-CV-1116
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ¹ ,	(ML)
Defendant.	
APPEARANCES:	OF COUNSEL:
LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH HILLER, PLLC Counsel for the Plaintiff 108 Westland Avenue Rochester, New York 14618	MELISSA KUBIAK, ESQ.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Counsel for the Defendant J.F.K. Federal Building, Room 625 15 New Sudbury Street Boston, Massachusetts 02203 TIMOTHY SEAN BOLEN, ESQ. Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court in this action, in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.² Oral

Kilolo Kijakazi is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security and is substituted as Defendant here pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The Clerk is directed to modify the docket accordingly.

This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if

argument was heard in connection with those motions on March 22, 2022, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination was not supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by Plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the Court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 17) is GRANTED.

2) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 21) is DENIED.

3) The Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff Social Security benefits is

REVERSED.

4) This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner, without a directed finding of

disability, for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion and the oral bench

decision, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

5) The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this

determination, REMANDING this matter to the Commissioner for further administrative

proceedings consistent with this opinion and the oral bench decision, pursuant to sentence four

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and closing this case.

Dated: March 25, 2022

Binghamton, New York

Miroslav Lovric

U.S. Magistrate Judge

slav Faris

cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

В

vs. 1:20-CV-1116

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Transcript of Decision & Order

March 22, 2022

Telephone Conference

The HONORABLE MIROSLAV LOVRIC Presiding.

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: MELISSA KUBIAK, ESQ.

For Defendant: TIMOTHY BOLEN, ESQ.

Ruth I. Lynch, RPR, RMR, NYSRCR Official United States Court Reporter Binghamton, New York 13901

1 THE COURT: The Court wants to begin by indicating that Plaintiff has commenced this proceeding pursuant to 2 3 Title 42 U.S. Code Sections 405(q) and 1383(c) to challenge the adverse determination by the Commissioner of Social 4 Security finding that she was not disabled at the relevant 5 6 times and therefore ineligible for the benefits that she 7 sought. 8 By way of background the Court notes as follows: Plaintiff was born in 1967. She is currently 9 approximately 54 years of age. She was 48 years old, 10 11 approximately, at the alleged onset of her disability on 12 December 17, 2016. 13 At the time of the administrative hearing on 14 May 13th, 2019, Plaintiff lived in an apartment with her 15 husband in the Buffalo, New York, area. 16 Plaintiff is approximately five feet one inch in 17 height, weighs approximately 150 pounds. 18 Plaintiff completed ninth grade, can read and 19 write in English, and can perform simple math. 20 Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as an outreach activity aide, a general office clerk, and a 21 22 bartender. 23 Plaintiff suffers from lumbar degenerative disc 24 disease, cervical degenerative disc disease, psoriatic 25 arthropathy, generalized osteoarthritis, status post left

1 shoulder tear and arthroscopy, occipital neuralgia of the left side, migraines, obesity, depression, and anxiety. 2 Plaintiff is prescribed Claritin, clobetasol 3 cream, co-enzyme diclofenac, gingko biloba, Humira, 4 hydroxyzine, isoniazid, magnesium, olopatadine; olopatadine 5 nasal spray, I should say; omeprazole, pyridoxine, 6 ranitidine, venlafaxine, and Singulair. 7 During her administrative hearing, Plaintiff 9 reported that she was able to get dressed, bathe, do housework, reach for items in front of her, write with a pen 10 in her dominant hand, and eat with utensils like a knife and 11 12 fork. However, Plaintiff testified that her husband does 13 the grocery shopping. Plaintiff also testified that she 14 remembers to take her medication as prescribed and can 15 follow instructions but has difficulties with focusing and 16 concentrating. 17 Procedurally the Court notes as follows in this 18 matter: 19 Plaintiff protectively applied for Title II 20 benefits on February 9th, 2017, alleging an onset date of 21 December 17th, 2016. 22 In support of her claim for disability benefits, Plaintiff claims disability based on psoriatic arthritis, 23 depressive disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, 24 25 gastroesophageal reflux disease, acute sinusitis,

dermatographic uticaria, vasomotor rhinitis, and hiatal
hernia.
Administrative Law Judge Bonnie Hannan conducted a

hearing on May 13th, 2019, to address Plaintiff's application for benefits. Plaintiff was represented by Nicholas DiVirgilio. Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified at that hearing.

ALJ Hannan issued an unfavorable decision on June 13th, 2019. That became a final determination of the agency on July 22nd, 2020, when the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's application for review.

This action was commenced on September 16, 2020, and it is timely.

In her decision, ALJ Hannan applied the familiar five-step test for determining disability.

At step one, she concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 17th, 2016, the alleged onset date.

At step two, she concluded that Plaintiff suffers from severe impairments that impose more than minimal limitations on her ability to perform basic work activities, specifically the severe impairments are as follows: Lumbar degenerative disc disease, cervical degenerative disc disease, psoriatic arthropathy, generalized osteoarthritis,

status post left shoulder tear and arthroscopy, occipital neuralgia on the left -- of the left side, migraines, obesity, depression, and anxiety. In addition, the ALJ concluded that the record failed to establish that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was a medically determinable impairment.

At step three, ALJ Hannan concluded that

Plaintiff's conditions do not meet or medically equal any of
the listed presumptively disabling conditions set forth in
the Commissioner's regulations, and the ALJ focused on the
following listings: Listing 1.02 deals with major
dysfunction of a joint; listing 1.04 dealing with disorders
of the spine; listing 12.04 dealing with depressive,
bipolar, and related disorders; and listing 12.06, dealing
with anxiety and obsessive compulsive disorders. The ALJ
also considered Plaintiff's obesity according to SSR 19-2p
and her migraines, headaches in accordance with
Section 11.00 concerning neurological impairments.

Between steps three and four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity, also known as RFC, to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that she can occasionally reach overhead to the left and frequently reach overhead to the right. The ALJ noted also she can frequently climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.

The ALJ went on to state Plaintiff can frequently balance and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Plaintiff can never -- Plaintiff -- excuse me, Plaintiff can never work at unprotected heights or with moving mechanical parts but can tolerate moderate noise. Plaintiff can never have exposure to extreme cold or extreme heat. Plaintiff must have access to a restroom facility but time off task can be accommodated by normal breaks.

The ALJ continued that Plaintiff can perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. Plaintiff can make simple work-related decisions and can tolerate few changes in a routine work setting defined as performing the same duties at the same station or location day to day. The ALJ also noted Plaintiff can have occasional and superficial contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work as an outreach activity aide, general office clerk, or bartender. The ALJ therefore proceeded to step five.

At step five, the ALJ concluded that considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. The vocational expert testified that given all of these factors, an individual would be able to perform the requirements of occupations

such as labeler, marker, and folder. As a result, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act.

As the parties know, the Court's functional role in this case is limited and extremely deferential. I must determine whether correct legal principles were applied and whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence, which is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support a conclusion. As the Second Circuit noted in case of Brault V. Social Security Administration Commissioner, found at 673 F.3d 443, 2012 case, the Second Circuit noted the standard is demanding, more so than the clearly erroneous standard. The Second Circuit also noted in Brault that once there is a finding of fact, that fact can be rejected only if a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude otherwise.

In this case Plaintiff raised one contention. Plaintiff argues that the exclusion of fibromyalgia as a medically determinable impairment was not supported by substantial evidence, causing subsequent steps in the sequential analysis to be unsupported by substantial evidence.

The Court provides the following analysis, and this analysis is what the Court bases its ultimate decision.

As the parties identified in their briefs, pursuant to SSR 12-p, there are two sets of criteria for diagnosing fibromyalgia. The first set of criteria requires, one, a history of widespread pain that has persisted for at least three months; two, at least 11 positive tender points on physical examination; and, three, evidence that other disorders that could have caused the symptoms or signs were excluded.

The second set of criteria requires, one, a history of widespread pain; two, repeated manifestations of six or more fibromyalgia symptoms, signs, or co-occuring conditions, especially manifestations of fatigue, cognitive or memory problems, waking unrefreshed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome; and, three, evidence that other disorders that could cause these repeated manifestations of symptoms, signs, or co-occurring conditions were excluded.

Either set of criteria is sufficient to establish the impairment.

Here in this case the ALJ's discussion of fibromyalgia, which concluded that it was not a medically determinable impairment, references two considerations. First, she concluded that the record did not indicate at least 11 positive bilateral tender points on physical examination. See transcript at page 13. That finding is

only relevant to one of the two criteria applicable to fibromyalgia. Second, the ALJ found that the record indicated that fibromyalgia overlapped with Plaintiff's psoriatic arthritis and osteoarthritis. See transcript page 13.

Now with respect to the ALJ's first consideration, as Plaintiff argues, Dr. Oza specified Plaintiff's bilateral tender points, which numbered more than the minimum number of 11. See transcript 1161. In addition, as I stated, the finding of whether the record indicates at least 11 tender points is only one relevant -- is -- excuse me, let me read that again. In addition, as I stated, the finding of whether the record indicates at least 11 tender points is only relevant to one of the two criteria applicable to fibromyalgia. Further, Defendant does not appear to contest this point because her response brief focuses solely on the second finding of the ALJ.

With respect to the ALJ's second consideration, I find that the ALJ did err. Initially, I note that the ALJ used -- excuse me, let me read that again. Initially, I note that the language used by the ALJ is vague and does not clearly articulate a finding that the record lacks evidence that other disorders could have caused the symptoms that -- could have caused the symptoms were excluded, which is the argument set forth in Defendant's brief.

However, even assuming that the ALJ did not make that finding, as Defendant asserts, the ALJ's decision is insufficient to demonstrate the proper analysis was conducted. On this point the Court references the case of Brandy L. V. Kijakazi, that can be found at 20-CV-1127, that's a 2022 Westlaw 675709 at page 4 case, it's a Northern District of New York decision issued March 7th of 2022, and therein citing case of Dawn P. V. Berryhill, a 2019 Westlaw 1024279 at page 7 case. That's a Northern District New York March 4th, 2019 case, standing for the proposition the ALJ has -- the ALJ has an obligation to provide a sufficiently specific decision so that the reviewing court can assess the propriety of the decision.

In this case here, the record indicates the following: On July 9th, 2018, NP Sgroi examined Plaintiff and concluded that, quote, I feel that she has an overlap of fibromyalgia and psoriatic arthritis, end quote. Transcript at page 1157.

On November 5th, 2018, Dr. Oza noted that Plaintiff's symptoms including pain, fatigue, poor quality of sleep, cognitive symptoms, trigger points, and the absence of certain clinical findings such as skin rash, oral ulcers, or synovitis suggested a diagnosis of fibromyalgia. See transcript 1164.

Next, on February 4th, 2019, Dr. Henry noted

fibromyalgia under a heading titled assessments and prescribed Plaintiff Levorphanol to assist -- assist with the pain Plaintiff complained of due to fibromyalgia and arthritis. See transcript 659.

On February 5th, 2019, NP Sgroi examined Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff, quote, continues to have diffuse positive tender points, nighttime awakening, nonrestful sleep, and daytime fatigue that would all go along with the diagnosis of myofascial pain, fibromyalgia. This condition may also be exacerbated pain due to other problems like osteoarthritis, end quotation. That can be found at transcript 1168.

Next, on February 8 of 2019 Plaintiff saw

NP McCormack and it was noted that she was recently

diagnosed with fibromyalgia. See transcript page 653.

Thereafter, on March 20th, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Schlehr, where it was noted that Plaintiff was recently diagnosed with fibromyalgia. See transcript 1582.

Then on April 23rd, 2019, Plaintiff saw

NP McCormack for follow-up on her fibromyalgia. See

transcript 1382.

The Court states that it may be that substantial evidence would support a well-reasoned conclusion that Plaintiff failed to establish the exclusion of other causes of her symptoms. I conclude only that the ALJ erred in

finding that there was no evidence of exclusion, to the extent that the ALJ's vague statement could be construed as making that conclusion, and I find that remand is required for a complete review of whether Plaintiff has carried her burden to establish fibromyalgia as a severe impairment.

Although an ALJ's failure to consider an impairment to be severe may be harmless error, that is so only if the ALJ found other severe impairments and considered the nonsevere impairment when formulating the claimant's RFC.

In this case, the Court cannot conclude that the error was harmless in this case. Courts have long recognized the unique nature of fibromyalgia makes it a particularly difficult condition to evaluate in the context of disability cases. Part of the difficulty in analyzing it relates to the fact that there are no objective tests which can conclusively confirm the disease. Here, in later parts of the ALJ's sequential analysis, she notes that Plaintiff's subject complaints are not consistent with the medical record taken as a whole. See transcript 16 through 17. For the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's brief, given that a different analysis of Plaintiff's fibromyalgia step two may have impacted the findings, the Court cannot find that the step two error was harmless. See Brandy L., 2022 Westlaw 675709 at page 4, and a collection of cases therein.

As a result of this analysis, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied. And Defendant's decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits is hereby reversed and the matter is remanded pursuant to sentence 4 of Section 450(g) for further proceedings. That constitutes the decision and order of this court.